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INTRODUCTION

The temperature had reached 105 degrees on that scorching summer
day Carmelo Fuentes collapsed from heat exhaustion in July 1998.'
Fuentes had been picking in the tomato fields of North Carolina most of
the day.2 He was denied a short break by his employer.3 He then began
to show the beginning signs of heat stress, but this was "dangerously ignored."4 Fuentes soon after collapsed from a heat stroke.5 At age 36, he
6
suffered from collapsed internal organs and severe brain damage.
Fuentes and thousands of others, mainly from Mexico, work in American fields under unfavorable conditions. They are working not as undocumented immigrants, but legally under the H-2A temporary
agricultural guest worker program. However, these legal workers are
often exploited and essentially reduced to indentured servitude.
The current guest worker program has its roots in the World War II
Bracero accord and the H-2 programs of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 (INA). 7 The programs were originally established to supply
personnel for domestic positions unfilled by American citizens. 8

1. Agricultural Job Opportunity Benefits and Security Act: Hearing on S.1814 Before

the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, 106th Cong. (2002) (statement of
Cecilia Mufioz, Vice-President for the Office of Research, Advocacy and Legislation of the
National Council of La Raza), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/5420cm.htm
(last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Victoria Lehrfeld, Patterns of Migration: The Revolving Door from Western
Mexico to California and Back Again, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 209, 219-20 (1995).
8. See Andrew Scott Kosegi, The H-2A Program: How the Weight of Agricultural Employer Subsidies is Breaking the Backs of Domestic Migrant Farm Workers, 35 IND. L. REV.
269, 270 (2001).
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Several members of Congress are currently trying to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to reform the H-2A temporary agricultural guest worker program. 9 Of the amendments, the proposed
legislation from Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Howard
Berman seek not only to bring temporary workers to replenish American
labor forces, but also to establish fair provisions that compensate immigrants regardless of their legal status.1 0
The first temporary worker program was introduced during World War
I.1 When the call of duty oversees drained much of the manpower in
the United States, the agricultural industry lacked workers.1 2 Consequently, the United States and Mexico bilaterally agreed to establish 1 a3
program that would allow Mexican immigrants to fill these positions.
This program saw its end in 1964.14
Under the INA, 15 an H-2 guest program was established to create another temporary guest worker program.16 Under the act, employers were
only permitted to hire foreign workers if no domestic workers were available to fill the jobs. 7 Eventually, under the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),' 8 the program was divided into two parts,

9. S. 1313, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2736, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1161, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R. 2457, 107th Cong. (2001). Identical bills were proposed by Democrats, Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Howard Berman, in 2001 to provide for the adjustment of status of certain foreign agricultural workers. Counterpart bills were proposed
by Republicans, Senator Larry Craig and Representative Christopher Cannon, to amend
the INA to streamline procedures for the admission and extension of stay of nonimmigrant
agricultural workers. Specifically, Representative Cannon's bill imposes wage rate limitations that the Secretary of Labor may require an employer to pay an alien who is an H-2A
nonimmigrant agricultural worker.
10. S. 1313, at §101(a)(1)(A)(i); H.R. 2736, at §101(a)(1)(i). One of the components
of the proposed legislation would be to adjust the status of an alien who performed agricultural employment in the United States for at least 540 hours or 90 work days, whichever is
less, for twelve consecutive months during an eighteen month period.
11. See Edward J. Williams, The Maquiladora Industry and Environmental Degradation in the United States - Mexico Borderlands, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 765, 771 (1996).
12. See id.
13. See Maria Elena Bickerton, Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with
Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, 79 TEX. L. REV. 895, 896 (2001).
14. See Lorenzo A. Alvarado, A Lesson From My Grandfather, The Bracero, 22 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 55, 59 (2001).
15. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
16. See Cecilia Danger, Comment, The H-2A Non-Immigrant Visa Program:Weakening its Provisions Would be a Step Backward for America's Farmworkers, 31 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 419, 420 (2001).
17. Immigration and Nationality Act §101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 66 Stat. at 168. See AFLCIO v. Brock, 835 F. 2d 912, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
18. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 5 [2022], No. 1, Art. 7

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 5:153

the H-2A and the H-2B programs.1 9 The programs differed by catego0
rizing agricultural and non-agricultural workers."
Although these pro21
unjust.
grams have been amended, they remain
If the current program is not revised, it will continue to exercise its
unfair and permanent reality for the estimated 45,000 Mexican migrants
who work under the program: 22 their deportation back to the
impover23
left.
eagerly
had
and
came
they
which
from
ished conditions
Additionally, the current program limits the legal protections given to
its participants who are not afforded the rights of permanent residents or
citizens.2 4 Paradoxically, the program also increases illegal immigration,
exploits guest workers 2 5 and creates discrimination due to the employer
sanction provisions.
Sen. Kennedy's and Rep. Berman's bills solve these issues by offering
(i) eventual permanent residency to the guest workers; (ii) allowing the
guest workers to be protected under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA); and (iii) maintaining the calculation of the wage currently offered to guest workers.26

II.

SUMMARY

This comment discusses the effectiveness of the current H-2A temporary agricultural guest worker program as established under the INA and
the problems guest workers face under the programs. Part III addresses
the historical background surrounding the guest worker program, begin-

19. Martinez v. Reich, 934 F. Supp. 232, 237 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
20. Id.
21. See Gail S. Coleman, Overcoming Mootness in the H-2A Temporary Foreign

Farmworker Program, 78 Geo. L. J. 197, 201 (1989) (stating that growers' interests are in
direct conflict with congressional policy, causing battles between the growers and the De-

partment of Labor).
22. See

CHRISTINE SOUZA, CALIFORNIA FARM BUREAU FED'N, FARM LABOR CON-

TRACTOR TRIES H-2A GUEST WORKER PROGRAM (2002), available at http://cfbf.com/
agalert/2002/aa-061902b.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
23. See PHILIP MARTIN, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION

STUDIES, GUEST WORKER PRO-

GRAMS FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY (2000), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2000/
back400.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
24. See id.; see also BRUCE GOLDSTEIN, FARMWORKER JUSTICE FUND, INC., THE
BASICS ABOUT GUESTWOKRER PROGRAMS (2001), available at http://www.fwjustice.organi

zation/talking.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
25. See Martin supra note 23 (estimating that 4.9 million illegal immigrants were ar-

rested during the Bracero years).
26. S. 1313, 107th Cong. §§ 101, 302, 218A (2001); H.R. 2736, 107th Cong. §§ 101, 302,

218A (2001). These specific components of the legislation call for i.) an adjustment of
status after a certain number of work hours have been completed, ii.) coverage under

AWPA, which would allow the workers to organize in labor unions, and iii.) the maintaining of the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR).
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ning with the World War II Bracero accord, and the revamping of the
guest worker program under the INA and IRCA. Part IV outlines the
current guest worker program as it stands today. Part V addresses the
negative effects guest worker programs have on its participants, which
include the increase of illegal immigration, the lack of rights guest workers are afforded, and the discrimination surrounding the employer sanctions. Part VI outlines the 2001 introduced legislation, which proposes to
amend the H-2A provisions under the INA and advocates for the passage
of the democratic legislation. Part VII proposes a blanket amnesty and
the passage of the democratic legislation which favors the guest worker.
Part VIII concludes the comment with a reiteration of the negativity surrounding the current guest worker program and reasons why guest workers should be afforded more rights.
III.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Inequities Suffered by Los Braceros, 1942-1964

"Is this indentured alien-an almost perfect model of the economic
man, an 'input factor' stripped of the political and social attributes
that liberal democracy likes to ascribe to all human beings ideally-is
this bracero program the prototype of the production man of the
future?"
-Ernesto

Galarza

27

"There comes a large cloud of dust
with no consideration
Women, children and old men
are being driven to the Border
Goodbye beloved countrymen
we are being deported
But we are not outlaws
we come to work."
-"El

Deportado," Mexican folk ballad2"

With the onset of World War II, United States farmers faced an enormous shortage of employees.2 9 In an effort to alleviate the problem, the
United States government bilaterally agreed with Mexico to procure the
27.
28.

ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR 16 (1964).
JAMES D. COCKCROFT, OUTLAWS IN THE PROMISED LAND: MEXICAN IMMIGRANT
WORKERS AND AMERICA'S FUTURE 64 (1986).

29. Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cockcroft, supra note 28, at

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 5 [2022], No. 1, Art. 7

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 5:153

urgently needed agricultural work force. 3 ° Thus, the Labor Importation
Program of 1942, better known as the "Bracero Program" was born.3 1
Under the program, farm workers were funneled from the impoverished
rural communities of Mexico to fields in the United States.3 2 In the beginning, approximately 118,000 Mexican farm workers ventured into American fields as a result of the program.3 3 The workers were assigned to
agricultural states such as California and Michigan. 34 The workers toiled
for extremely long hours for low wages. 35
The Braceros' contracts were often drafted in English. 36 This language
barrier prevented the workers from fully understanding the provisions in
their contracts, such that taxes were being deducted from their
paychecks, or that there was a possibility of negotiations regarding their
wages. 37 After the Bracero's contracts and temporary guest worker visas
were expired, they were sent back across the border. 38
Under the Bracero system, workers were subject to the absolute power
of their employers.3 9 The workers had minimal rights and worked at the
whim of their overseers. 40 However, as the number of undocumented
Mexican workers grew, it created a large pool of inexpensive agricultural
41
workers, resulting in an unnecessary guest worker program.

30. See id. See generally, GALARZA, supra note 27, at 9, 46-57 (1964).
31. TED Case Studies, Los Braceros 1942-1964: Mexican Labor Importation, at http://
www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/bracero.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2003). The
term "Bracero" is a Spanish word, literally meaning arm or strong arm. ROBERT B. TAYLOR, A STUDY IN THE ACQUISITION & USE OF POWER, CHAVEZ AND THE FARM WORKERS

67 (1975).
32. Walter Ewing, A New Bracero Program for the 21st Century, 19 Wash. Report on
the Hemisphere No. 19 (1999), available at http://www.crlaf.org/cohal814.htm (last visited
Oct. 24, 2002).
33. See ROBERT C. JONES, MEXICAN WAR WORKERS IN THE U.S. 24 (1945).
34.

A. DRISCOLL, THE TRACKS NORTH: THE RAILROAD BRACERO PROWWII 51 (1999).
35. Ewing, supra note 32 (stating that farm workers toiled for extremely low wages
until their contracts expired).
36. See id.
37. Pam Belluck, Mexican Labors in U.S. During War Sue for Back Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2001, available at 2001 WL 20056795.
38. TAYLOR, supra note 31; Ewing, supra note 32.
39. See generally MARIA HERRERA-SOBEK, THE BRACERO EXPERIENCE ELITELORE
VERSUS FOLKLORE 39-74 (1979) (discussing the story of Pedro Tarango in the Bracero
Program); Ewing, supra note 32 (citing the absolute power enjoyed by employers under
the Bracero Program).
40. See generally HERRERA-SOBEK, supra note 39, at 39-74 (discussing the experience
of Pedro Tarango in the Bracero Program); Ewing, supra note 32.
BARBARA

GRAM OF

41. See

CARLOS

E.

CORTES, MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 50-51

(1976); see also TAYLOR, supra note 38, at 106.
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In 1960, Edward R. Murrow released his Harvest of Shame documentary which candidly and graphically exposed the squalid conditions and
abuse surrounding the Bracero Program.4 2 Murrow's television documentary, in addition to other economic reasons, triggered an ardent opposition to the Bracero Program by labor unions and civil rights groups
during the 1960s.43 Faced with discontentment, Congress began to reevaluate the Bracero Program.44 In 1964, during the height of this controversy, Congress allowed the Bracero Program to expire.45 Overall, an estimated 4.5 million immigrants worked as Braceros during the program's
existence.4 6 By the end of the 1950s, more than 400,000 workers had migrated to the United States on an annual basis to participate in the
Bracero Program.4"
The inequities faced by the Braceros during the aforementioned program have recently been addressed. Unfortunately, justice has continued
to be denied. In September 2001, a class-action lawsuit was filed in California against the governments of the United States and Mexico calling
for the reparation of an alleged $500 million plus interest estimated to
have been withheld from Mexican immigrants who participated in the
Bracero Program.4 8 The reparation lawsuit was brought on behalf of approximately 300,000 Mexican laborers " Between 1942 and 1949, 10 percent of the Braceros' wages, which included social security money and
transferred wages, were deducted from their paychecks.5 ° That money
was put into personal United States savings accounts. 51 At the end of the
labor periods, the money was to have been transferred from the personal

42. See TAYLOR, supra note 31, at 106.
43. See id.
44. See Kimi Jackson, Farmworkers,Nonimmigrant Policy, Involuntary Servitude, and
a Look at the Shepherding Industry, 76 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 1271, 1276 (2000).

45. See id. at 1271-72.
46. Danger, supra note 16, at 422.
47. Id.
48. Belluck, supra note 37; Former Mexican Guest Workers Regroup in Bid to Claim
Unpaid Wages, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26638665;
Suit Seeks Back Pay For Mexican Guest Workers, HOUSTON CHRON., June 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3270049.
49. Belluck, supra note 37; Former Mexican Guest Workers Regroup, supra note 48.
50. Belluck, supra note 37; Oscar Avila, Judge Nullifies Mexican Migrant Workers' Suit
For WWII Pay, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26636577; Minerva Canto,
Braceros Suing For Back Pay Win Delay, ORANGE CO. OBSERVER, Feb. 16, 2002, available
at 2002 WL 5440366; Suit Seeking Mexican Worker Back Pay Dismissed, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Aug. 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26317618.
51. Belluck, supra note 37; Canto, supra note 50; Suit Seeks For Back Pay, supra note
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United States accounts to accounts in Mexico. 52 Experts assert that many
Braceros did not know of their entitlements. 53 Other workers were falsely
informed that no such accounts existed, or received empty promises that
never materialized.5 4
One such example is Felipe Nava, a 78-year-old man, who came to Syracuse, New York in 1943 to work as a railroad laborer.55 Mr. Nava said
he was never aware that money was being deducted from his paycheck,
nor that he was entitled to receive his earnings once he returned to Mexico. 56 "We came to help this country during the Second World War," Mr.
Nava said, "This is wrong. Somewhere, somehow they should tell us we
were supposed to have money. '57 United States records show that as
much as $32 million was withheld, and, unfortunately it is unclear how
much was returned.58 A 1946 record from the Mexican government
shows all but $6 million was transferred.5 9 Advocates estimate that with
interest, the total amount owed could be as much as $500 million.6 °
The Braceros' battle for reparation came to an unfavorable end in August 2002.61 The United States District Court, Northern District of California, ruled against the Braceros' claims and granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss.62 The defendants included Mexico, two Mexican
banks, the United States, and Wells Fargo American Bank.6 3 The court
concluded that the Mexican banks and Mexico were absolutely immune
to suit, that there was no breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty by
Wells Fargo Bank, and that the United States government was protected
from suit by the statute of limitations.6 4

52. Suit Seeks Back Pay, supra note 48; Suit Seeking Mexican Worker Back Pay Dismissed, supra note 50.
53. Former Mexican Workers Regroup, supra note 48 (noting that lawyers represent-

ing the Braceros have argued that many of them were illiterate and unable to understand
the terms of their contracts and were unaware they were entitled to money).
54. Suit Seeks Back Pay, supra note 48 (quoting a former Bracero as stating "I went
back to Mexico City to the government office to see about my 10 percent. They said, what
are you talking about? Get out of here.").
55. Belluck, supra note 37.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Avila, supra note 50; Former Mexican Workers Regroup, supra note 48; Suit Seeks
Back Pay, supra note 48.

61. Cruz v. United States, No. C-01-00892 CRB, 2002 WL 2001967, at *16 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 23, 2002).
62. Cruz, 2002 WL 2001967, at *16.
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id., at *6-9, 16.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol5/iss1/7

8

Oliveira: A License to Exploit: The Need to Reform the H-2A Temporary Agric

2002]

B.

THE H-2A

The H-2 Guest Worker Program as Introduced Under the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952

Aside from the Bracero Program, other guest worker programs have
existed in the United States. The major programs were the H-2 programs
established under the INA in 1952.65 The INA delegated to the Attorney

General the power to authorize visas for temporary foreign workers, if
there were no unemployed persons capable of performing agricultural or

non-agricultural jobs in the United States.6 6 The process to fill empty
jobs with foreign workers under the INA, was called the H-2 program.6 7

Under the INA, the Attorney General required domestic employers to
pay temporary foreign workers nothing lower than the hourly Adverse
Effect Wage Rate (AEWR).6 8 This wage rate approximated the rates
that may have existed had there not been an increase in foreign labor
supply. 69 Employers were only allowed to hire foreign workers if no do-

mestic workers applied for positions offered at these rates.7v
C.

The H-2A and H-2B Programs Crystallized Under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986

After many years of disagreement over the effectiveness and fairness
of the Bracero Program and its progeny, Congress passed IRCA in

65. See AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(H)(ii) (1988). The statute authorizes the Attorney General
to approve visas to temporary foreign workers, categorized as nonimmigrant aliens under
this statute, "if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be
found in this country [the United States]." Id.
67. See Brock, 835 F.2d at 913. After the act was implemented, the Department of
Labor adopted their "so-called" H-2 regulations, hence the name. Id. The program administered the certification process of foreign workers who applied for employment under the
guest worker program. Id.
68. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (h)(3) (1986). See also, Brock, 835 F.2d at 913. Congress' mandate that the employment of nonimmigrants participating under the H-2 program not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of United States employees, was done by
prohibiting employers from paying foreign employees below an hourly "adverse effect
wage rate" (AEWR). Id. If no United States workers applied for positions at these rates,
employers were then allowed to fill the vacant positions with foreign workers. Id. Additionally, if United States workers demanded higher than AEWR wages from H-2 employers, those domestic workers would be considered unavailable for employment and
employers could then fill those positions with foreign workers. Id. The inference could then
be made that much of the legislative history behind the H-2 program concentrated on
protecting the United States employer and employee. Id.
69. See Brock, 835 F.2d at 913.
70. See id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

9

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 5 [2022], No. 1, Art. 7

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 5:153

1986.71 Pressure by powerful lobbyists to restrict immigration led to the
passage of IRCA.7 2
Among the provisions of IRCA was a revised H-2 program.7 3 The law
allowed the temporary admission of foreign workers to perform labor
only if a shortage of United States workers existed.7 4 Specifically, the law
allowed admission of nonimmigrant aliens whom: "having a residence in
a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning... is coming
temporarily to the United States to perform temporary services of labor,
if unemployed persons capable to performing such services or labor cannot be found in the country."'7 5
Employers in the agricultural industry as well as employers in the hotel
and restaurant businesses commonly used the original H-2 program.7 6
The original H-2 program did not statutorily limit the number of workers
that could be admitted and thus, approximately 30,000 were admitted
each year.7 7 The Employment and Training Administration in the Department of Labor and the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the
Department of Justice issued detailed regulations that governed the
program.7 8
Congress viewed the original H-2 program regulations as not affording
enough equal protection to the interests of the agricultural employers and
non-agricultural workers.7 9 Congress recognized there were unique
needs of growers and an inadequacy of current protections for farm

71. See L. Tracy Harris, Note, Conflict or Double Deterrence? FLSA Protection of
Illegal Aliens and the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 72 MINN. L. REv. 900, 909-10

(1988).

72. See Lehrfeld, supra note 7, at 219-20 (stating that lobbyists such as The Federation
of American Immigration Reform worked to limit immigration).
73. Wint v. Yeutter, 902 F.2d 76, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Additionally, "Congress included in IRCA a new Seasonal Agricultural Worker (SAW) program." Id. The program
gave eligible participants legal authorization to work in the United States and an opportunity to obtain permanent residence. Id. To qualify, applicants must have shown that they
had been present in the United States and performed "seasonal agricultural services," as
defined in the statute, for a minimum of 90 days during the year ending on May 1,1986. Id.
The H-2A visa program differed from SAW in that SAW participants were eligible for legal
permanent residence status whereas H-2A participants were not; they were allowed to stay
legally in the United States as long as they remained employed by the job for which their
visas were issued. Id. After the time limit on their visas expired, they had to return to the
country from where they came with no chance of obtaining permanent status. Id.
74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186 (a)(1)(A) (Supp. V. 1987).
75. See id.
76. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, at 80 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5684.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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workers.8 0 Therefore, IRCA established a "separate and distinct H-2
program for agriculture, referred to as the H-2A program., 8 1 The Act
"crystallized" the difference between agricultural and non-agricultural laborers by creating the H-2A agricultural program and the H-2B non-agricultural program.12 The H-2A program established a method for
agricultural employers to cope with a shortage of domestic workers by
bringing nonimmigrant aliens to the United States to do temporary agricultural work. 3 The purpose of the H-2A program is to balance the following competing interests: "to assure an adequate labor force on the one
hand and to protect the jobs of citizens on the other.' ' 4
The IRCA amendments also imposed civil as well as criminal penalties
against United States employers who hire illegal immigrants.8 5 Unfortunately, IRCA's penalties proved easy to avoid.8 6 Employers would simply use recruiters who would vouch for the documented status of the
contracted laborers.8 7 A loophole emerged for employers, wherein the
contractors would face penalties when the workers were determined to
be undocumented. 8 Thus, the employers escaped punishment.8 9

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) and (b) (1988); Martinez v. Reich, 934 F. Supp.
232, 237 (S.D. Tex. 1996). Prior to IRCA, Congress did not differentiate between nonagricultural and agricultural temporary foreign workers. Id. All workers under the program were referred to as "H-2" workers. Id.
83. See Caraballo v. Reich, 11 F.3d 186, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
84. See Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617, 626 (3d Cir. 1977). Judicial interpretation of
the Congressional intent behind the temporary foreign worker programs was articulated by
Circuit Judge Maris for the District Court of the Virgin Islands, in 1968, when he stated:
"Congressional policy ... is that American labor be protected and that temporary workers
be admitted only when it tends to serve national economy, cultural interests, and welfare of
the United States, by facilitating entry for temporary residence of aliens whose specialized
experience or exceptional ability would best serve the American needs." Id.; see also, Larson, 563 F. 2d. at 626 n.10.
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (Supp. VI 1986). IRCA imposed civil penalties on employers ranging from $250 to $10,000 for each unlawfully employed undocumented alien.
Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 a(f)(1). Criminal penalties of IRCA included a fine of up to $3000 for
each employed undocumented alien and up to six months imprisonment for repeated offenses. Id.
86. Lehrfeld, supra note 7, at 220. Employers eluded IRCA's penalties by relying on
contractors who would recruit Mexican farm laborers. Id.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Flaws in the structure of IRCA have resulted in fraud, bias, and a large
number of undocumented workers in agriculture.9" Another IRCA loophole allows employers to claim an affirmative defense to the sanctions,
provided they show good faith reliance on the false documentation
presented by the worker.9 As a result, employers encounter no liability
for hiring undocumented workers if the documents presented reasonably
appear genuine. 92 Though it is not expected for employers to become
document experts, the program provides ample opportunity to commit
fraud.
IV. THE CURRENT H-2A TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL GUEST
WORKER PROGRAM AS CODIFIED IN THE FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND GOVERNED

BY THE

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

A.

Who May Apply

The Department of Labor governs the application process for the authorization and importation of temporary agriculture workers.94 The
Secretary of Labor certifies petitions for H-2A workers and approves petitions based on the statutory standards set out in the INA. 95 The standards include: i) whether there are sufficient able, willing, and qualified
United States workers available to perform the temporary and seasonal
agricultural services for which an employer desires to import nonimmigrant foreign workers (H-2A workers); and ii) whether the employment
of H-2A workers will adversely affect the wages and working conditions
of workers in the United States similarly employed.96 The Secretary of
97
Labor determines whether these standards are met.

90. See generally Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.3d 229, 233 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (discussing a case in which an employer claims to be "innocent" in his employment of an undocumented alien do to contract fraud).
91. Steven Alan Elberg, Agriculture and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of

1986: Reform or Relapse?, 3 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 197, 207-08 (1993).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 20 C.F.R. § 655.90 (a) (2002).
95. 20 C.F.R. § 655.90 (b) (2002).
96. 20 C.F.R. § 655.90 (b)(1)(A)-(B) (2002). See Elton Orchards, Inc. v. Brennan, 508
F.2d 493, 499-500 (1st Cir. 1974) (interpreting the policy of the immigration statutes to
mean that domestic workers, rather than immigrant workers, be given priority when employment decisions are made); Williams v. Usery, 531 F.2d 305, 306 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating
that the Secretary of Labor's authority in determining the wage that must be paid to all
workers is limited to neutralizing any adverse effect the influx of immigrants would have
on the economy).

97. 20 C.F.R. § 655.90 (b)(2) (2002).
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Agricultural employers who need workers to carry out services or labor
of a seasonal or temporary nature are eligible to apply for the program. 98
The term "employer" includes persons, corporations, firms, and associations of agricultural producers. 99 Applicants must submit two applications: 1) an Application for Alien Employment Certification (Form ETA
750, Part A. Offer of Employment) and 2) an Agricultural and Food
Processing Clearance Order (Form ETA 790).l °°
B.

When to Apply

Applications must be received 45 calendar days before the first date on
which the employees are needed.' 1 The Regional Administrator (RA)
will grant or deny the certification application no later than 20 calendar
days before the employment date of need.' 1 2 Applications may be filed
in person, may be mailed (certified, return receipt requested), or delivered by guaranteed commercial delivery to the appropriate RA and local
office of the State Employment Service."1 3
C. Notification of Acceptance of Application and Final Determinations
The RA will promptly notify the applicant in writing whether the application is acceptable as filed, or whether modifications are required.10 4 If
the RA determines that the application is acceptable, a copy of the notice
will also be sent to the related state agency. 10 5 The pertaining state
agency must then immediately begin recruiting United States workers to
fill the jobs offered by the applicant." 6 The applicant must also engage in
positive recruitment efforts to locate United States workers to fill these
10 7
jobs.

98. 20 C.F.R. § 655.101 (a) (2002).
99. 20 C.F.R. § 655.100 (b) (2002).
100. AGRICULTURAL LABOR AFFAIRS,

U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, TEMPORARY

FOREIGN WORKER PROGRAM -

SUMMARY: HIGHLIGHTS OF LABOR CERTIFICATION PROCESS FOR THE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S. - H-

2A PROGRAM (1988), at http://www.usda.gov/oce/oce/labor-affairs/h2asumm.htm (last visited January 30, 2003) (providing a practical guide to the H-2A application process, which
includes the proper applications interested employers must file with the DOL).

101. 20 C.F.R. § 655.101(c) (2002).
102. Id.
103. 20 C.F.R. § 655.101(c)(1) (2002).

104. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 655.104(e) (2002); 20 C.F.R. § 655.105(a) (2002).
105. 20 C.F.R. § 655.105(a).
106. Id.
107. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(d) (2002) (explaining how applicants must independently

engage in recruiting efforts of United States workers as well as assist their state agencies by
placing newspaper and radio advertisements which describe the related job offers).
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After such efforts, and within the 20-day guideline, the RA will approve the application if the employer has complied with the recruitment
assurances and adverse effect criteria.1" 8 The RA shall then grant enough
temporary guest workers to fill the job positions needed. 10 9 In short, the
decision to approve the importation of temporary workers will not only
be based on the availability of United States workers, but also on whether
the employers took gallant measures to recruit United States workers to
fill the jobs.10
After certification, the recruitment process must continue until the H2A workers have departed from the place of work."1 In addition,
from the time the foreign workers depart for the employer's place of
employment, the employer . . . shall provide employment to any
qualified, eligible U.S. worker who applies to the employer until
the foreign
50% of the period of the work contract, under which
2
worker who is in the job was hired, has elapsed.1
D. Conditions to be Followed by the Employers
1. Food and Housing
Among the mandatory recruitment efforts and the mandatory wage
guidelines employers must comply with, certain standards must also be
afforded to the imported foreign workers. For example, free and OSHA
approved 1 3 housing must be given to employees if they cannot return to
their residences on the days they work. 1 ' 4 Additionally, employers must
either provide three meals a day to each worker, or provide kitchen facilities where the workers can prepare their own meals." 5
2.

Transportation and Supplies

Employers may advance transportation costs for their employees when
initially coming to the worksite, if that is the prevailing practice in that
area by non H-2A agricultural employers." 6 Alternatively, after fifty
percent of the work contract period has been completed, employers must
108. 20 C.F.R. § 655.106(b)(1) (2002).
109. Id.
110. 20 C.F.R. § 655.105(d) (2002).
111. See id.
112. 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(e) (2002).
113. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(1)(i) (2002).
114. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(1) (2002).
115. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(4) (2002) (explaining that if employers provide meals
for their workers, they shall set a charge for the meal no more than $5.26 per day, unless
the RA has approved for more).
116. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(5)(i) (2002).
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reimburse their workers the cost of transportation that they incurred
coming to the worksite. 11 7 The employer must also provide adequate
transportation.11 8 Such transportation provisions must be in accordance
with applicable laws and regulatiofis 1 1 0
3.

Workers' Compensation and Contract Guarantees

Employers must provide free insurance to their employees which covers injury or disease arising from employment in accordance with state
workers' compensation laws.120 Further, employers must guarantee each
worker employment for at least three-fourths of the workdays during the
agreed work period outlined in their work contract.12 ' Employers must
provide each worker a copy of their work contracts 22 and a statement of
work hours completed and their related earnings for the day.2 3 Employees must be paid at least on a bi-monthly period. 2 4
V.

WHY THE CURRENT

H-2A

TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL GUEST

WORKER PROGRAM IS INEFFECTIVE AND UNJUST

A.

Guest Worker Programs Fail to Reduce Illegal Migration

The current H-2A guest worker program was solidified under IRCA in
1986. One of the major policies behind developing new immigration programs and guidelines under IRCA was to curtail illegal immigration. 25
However, IRCA was unsuccessful in meeting its goal. 12 6 In 1990, there
were between three million and four million undocumented immigrants
in the United States. 27 By 1995, the number of undocumented aliens in
the United States was comparable to the pre-IRCA number, illustrating
the nonexistent effect on the influx of illegal aliens.1 28
In response to the failed efforts of IRCA to reduce illegal immigration,
the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) developed new tactics
117. Id.
118. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(5)(iii) (2002).
119. Id.
120. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(2) (2002).

121. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(6) (2002).
122. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(14) (2002).
123. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(8) (2002).
124. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(10) (2002) (stating that an alternative to the bi-monthly pay
requirement is adopting a local customary pay period).
125. Evangeline G. Abriel, Ending the Welcome: Changes in the United States' Treatment of Undocumented Aliens (1986 to 1996), 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1, 11 (1998).
126. Id. (discussing the data derived from the House Committee on the Judiciary).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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to tighten entry and decrease the inflow of undocumented aliens.12 9 In
August 1994, a national deterrence plan 13 1 called for the building of tall
walls along the 2,000-mile border separating the United States and Mexico, as well as an increase of 800 armed agents guarding the posts, and a
budget increase of 148 percent.13' However, tightened entries of the safer
formiroutes have forced the undocumented immigrants to choose more
13 2
desert.
Arizona
the
in
Path"
dable entrance routes like "Devil's
Since the INS issued the new policy, immigrant deaths have risen, including 367 deaths in 2000, mainly due to heat exhaustion and exposure. 33 In addition to the sun and dehydration, undocumented
immigrants attempting to cross into the United States have also faced
violence from private landowners.' 3 4 In the last three years there have
been six reported cases of undocumented immigrants shot while crossing
through private land, each victim shot in the back. 135 The shootings have
left two dead and one permanently paralyzed. 36 No convictions of murder have been handed down and only one of the assailants has been
imprisoned.1 37
B.

Guest Workers are not Afforded Complete Rights in the United
States

Other problems that have risen under the H-2A program stem from
the minimal protections and the limited benefits temporary visas afford
foreign workers.'13 For example, farmers are required to provide foreign
workers with housing and pay for transportation to their job sites. 139 In
addition, farmers are required to pay their employees the higher rate
from a group of prevailing average wage rates paid for a similar job. 4 '

129. See Dane Schiller, Tighter Grip on Frontier:Border Patrol'sStrategy Forces Illegal
CrossingsAway From Urban Areas, S.A. EXPRESS NEWS, Sept. 2, 2001, at 1A,

available at

2001 WL 26837951.
130. Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAvIS J. INT'L &
POL'Y 121, 127 (2001). The deterrence plan included the use of lighting and motion sensors
and metal fences to keep undocumented aliens from crossing the border. Id.
131. See Schiller, supra note 129.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Lisa Sandberg, Shootings Inflaming Tensions Along Border, S.A. EXPRESS
NEWS, May 28, 2000, at 1A, available at 2000 WL 27524130.
135. See Pamela Colloff, The Battle for the Border, TEXAS MONTHLY, Apr. 2001, at 98.
136. See id.
137. See id. (noting that a former DEA agent pled guilty to aggravated assault and
deadly conduct and received a fifteen-year prison sentence).
138. See Farmer v. Employment Sec. Com'n of N.C., 4 F.3d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1993).
139. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(1) (2002); 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(5)(iii) (2002).
140. Farmer,4 F.3d at 1276.
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However, housing need only be provided when that is the prevailing
practice in the area.14 1 In North Carolina housing only needs to be offered to the workers, not their families.1 42 Therefore, temporary workers
are exploited more than those who come illegally
because temporary
143
program.
visa
H-2A
the
by
bound
are
workers
Additionally, temporary foreign workers are unable to switch jobs and
are bound to the contractors who hired them. 144 Contracts are usually not
available to the workers until they arrive in the states in which they are
employed.1 45 Unfortunately, many of these foreign workers give up considerable control of their lives. 146 Unlike migrant workers, H-2A workers
do not have
the right to choose their employer or negotiate wages and
14 7
hours.

In 1983, Congress recognized that migrant farm workers needed "whistle blowing" protection. 148 Consequently, AWPA 1 49 was enacted. The
Act afforded migrant farm workers protection when they were retaliated
against for complaining about substandard conditions. 150 However,
under AWPA, H-2A workers are excluded, and thus they lack even this
basic protection."'
A new guest worker program would have to call for organized housing
and transportation provisions, as well as the freedom to contract with alternate employers. Such rights, though, have been exceptionally slow in
coming to temporary foreign workers.
C. Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination
Another provision under the current guest worker program requires
employers to verify workers' employment eligibility, and imposes strict

141. Id.
142. Id. at 1282 (acknowledging that family housing is not the prevailing practice in
North Carolina).
143. New York's Harvest of Shame/First of a Two-Part Series on the Plight of Farm

Workers, N.Y.

DAILY NEWS,

Aug. 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17239765.

144. Id.
145. Leah Beth Ward, Desperate Harvest:N. C. Grower's Trade in Foreign Farm Workers Draws Scrutiny, CHARLOrrE OBSERVER, Oct. 30, 1999, available at http://
are.berkeley.edu/APMP/pubs/agworkvisa/desperatel03099.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2003)
(stating that mistreated workers are likely to remain silent rather than be put on an employer's blacklist).
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 1855(a) (2000).
149. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-470,
96 Stat. 2584 (1983) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1.801 to 1872 (2000)).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 1855(b) (2000).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(10)(B)(iii) (2000).
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civil 152 and criminal penalties against employers who violate this provi-

sion by knowingly hiring unauthorized workers. 153 Under IRCA, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) must issue three annual reports to
Congress evaluating the employer sanctions provision.1 54 The annual reports determine whether the sanctions create unnecessary burdens on
employers, whether these sanctions are being carried out satisfactorily,
and if the sanctions result in a pattern of discrimination against eligible
workers.' 5 5 If the GAO reports widespread patterns of discrimination
"against eligible workers seeking employment solely from the implementation of that section," IRCA provides an option for Congress that would
allow for the repealing of sanctions and anti-discrimination parts of the
law. 1 56 While IRCA does not define the terminology "widespread pattern of discrimination," the legislative history indicates that it was intended to mean "aserious pattern of discrimination," and not "just a few
'
isolated cases of discrimination. 157
In their third report to Congress, the GAO surveyed over 9,400 domestic employers, which is representative of a total of approximately 4.6 million employers within the United States. 1 58 The GAO estimated that
227,000 employers did not hire applicants with foreign appearances or
accents due to suspicion that the applicant might be an unauthorized
alien. "5' 9 Also, an estimated 346,000 employers reported a practice by
which they only applied IRCA's verification system to applicants who
had a "foreign" accent or appearance.1 60 Additionally, the GAO estimated that 430,000 employers began hiring only people who were born in
the United States or not hiring applicants with temporary work eligibility
documents because of IRCA.' 6 '
Though the GAO report clearly indicated discrimination resulted from
the employer sanctioning sections of IRCA, Congress refused to repeal
152. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (2002). IRCA imposes civil fines ranging from $250 to
$10,000 for each alien employed illegally. Id.
153. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1) (2002). Criminal penalties of IRCA include a fine of up to
$3000 for each employed illegal alien and up to six months imprisonment for repeated

offenses. Id.

154. Letter from Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States, to
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Mar. 29,
1990) (on file with the United States General Accounting Office).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 2 (1990).
158. See id. at 3.
159. See id. at 6.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 7.
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the legislation, finding the results unpersuasive enough to revamp the existing law.
D.

The Exploitation of the Guest Worker by the American Employer

Domestic labor organizations assert that, under the H-2A program,
growers prefer to hire temporary foreign laborers over domestic farm
162
workers, which effectively takes jobs away from United States citizens.
One reason foreign farm workers are preferred is that they normally
travel without their families, and can therefore be easily housed. 1 63 Additionally, foreign workers are often in extreme economic need, which
allows employers to manipulate wage rates.1 64 As a result,1 65employers are
able to take advantage of vulnerable temporary workers.
For example, in Marquis v. United States Sugar Corp.,16 6 domestic farm
workers were hired for field positions. 6 7 However, those positions were
allegedly going to be discharged and given to foreign workers. 168 The
domestic workers asserted that they were fired without cause, and that
employers maintained a blacklist among the industry
of domestic workers
169
who had not completed a prior work contract.
Also, in Montelongo v. Meese, 7 ° cantaloupe, onion, and pepper growers were forced to recruit domestic farm workers when the INS tightened
entry on the border. 171 Prior to this, the growers had relied heavily on
foreign farm workers.17 2 In early June, the growers spoke with domestic
crew leaders and offered them and their farm workers jobs by mid-

162. Andrew W. Baker, Immigration Reform - Provisions in the Proposed Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985 Permittingthe Use of Temporary Foreign Workers in
the United States - Importing Laborfrom Mexico, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 671, 678-79
(1995).
163. See Danger, supra note 16, at 430.
164. See id.
165. See U.S. v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 563-64 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting a case in which a
camp owner kept foreign farm workers captive and repeatedly threatened and beat the
guest workers). See generally Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, No. Civ.
77-329 PHX CAM (D. Ariz, 1985) (showing extreme grower abuse among the foreign farm
workers, in which no housing was provided, the workers slept in the fields, and were given
water from irrigation ditches).
166. 652 F. Supp. 598 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
167. Marquis v. United States Sugar Corp., 652 F. Supp. 598, 599-600 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
Coleman, supra note 21.
168. Marquis, 652 F. Supp at 599-600; Coleman, supra note 21.
169. Marquis, 652 F. Supp at 599-600; Coleman, supra note 21.
170. 803 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1986).
171. Montelongo v. Meese, 803 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1986); Coleman, supra note
21.
172. Montelongo, 803 F.2d 1345; Coleman, supra note 21.
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June. 173 But by June the growers were certified to receive temporary foreign guest workers. 1 74 The deal between the growers and the domestic
laborers was called off when the domestic crew leaders returned for instructions, and domestic farm workers who had relied on the jobs were
left unemployed. 175 These cases indicate there are some instances foreign
workers are preferred over domestic workers because of the employers
position to exploit the conditions of the guest worker program.
From 1995 to 1996 the Department of Labor conducted a study in an
attempt to determine whether United States employers were filling jobs
with domestic employees before recruiting temporary foreign workers.17 6
The report found that only 18,000 H-2A crop workers were certified to
work in the United States during 1996, while 600,000 workers were illegal
immigrants. 177 The conclusion of the report was that the H-2A program's
hiring process was ineffective, and characterized as having extensive administrative requirements that often seemed counterproductive to 178
the
Department of Labor's mandate to protect American worker's jobs.
Temporary work programs should be established to bring workers to
the United States in an effort to fill vacated jobs, and compensates those
who are currently working and adding to the United States economy.
They should not exploit these workers, and in the process take jobs from
domestic workers and thus become a determent to wages and the
economy.
In its 1997 report, the GAO made recommendations to Congress, the
Attorney General, and the Secretary of Labor on how to improve the H2A programs. 1 79 The report illustrated how the program could balance
the needs of agricultural employers while protecting the wages and working conditions of farm workers.
By examining the faults of the H-2A program, the GAO report concluded that "[a] sudden widespread farm labor shortage requiring the importation of large numbers of foreign workers is unlikely to occur in the
near future."' 80 Also, the GAO determined that farmers who have sought

173. Montelongo, 803 F.2d 1345; Coleman, supra note 21.
174. Montelongo, 803 F.2d 1345; Coleman, supra note 21.

175. Montelongo, 803 F.2d 1345; Coleman, supra note 21.
176. Danger, supra note 16, at 430.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. HEALTH, EDUC., AND HUMAN SERVICES Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
H-2A AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKER PROGRAM - CHANGES COULD IMPROVE SERVICES
TO EMPLOYERS AND BETER PROTECT WORKERS (1997), available at 1997 WL 835214, at
*10 [ hereinafter AGRICULTURAL GUEST WORKER PROGRAM]. See also Danger, supra
note 16, at 435.
180. Danger, supra note 16, at 428.
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workers using the H-2A program have obtained foreign agricultural
workers both regularly and in an emergency basis.' 8' However, the report also found that the Department of Labor has problems processing
applications on time, thus making it difficult
for employers to ensure that
82
workers will be placed where needed.'
Employers who use the H-2A program must apply 45 calendar days
before the first date on which the employees are needed.18 3 The RA will
grant or deny the certification application no later than 20 calendar days
before the employment date of need.1 84 However, farmers claim that the
weather and other factors make it impossible to hypothesize when workers will be needed.185 The farmers assert that such conditions make it
difficult to estimate in advance when workers will be needed, especially
for crops with short harvest periods.' 8 6
Furthermore, the study found that the Department of Labor does not
keep adequate data to determine the cause of its failure to meet regulatory and statutory deadlines for both emergency and regular applications.1 87 The GAO also found that the Department of Labor's handbook
on the H-2A worker protection provisions was confusing, outdated, and
incomplete.' 8 8 Additionally, foreign guest workers are unlikely to complain about worker protection violations, such as the three-quarter guarantee.' 8 9 The GAO asserts that guest workers are fearful that
complaining about working conditions will result in their termination or
deter employers from rehiring them in the future.' 90

VI.

THE PROSPECTUS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
GUEST WORKER PROGRAM

"We look at workers as workers, not at their nationalities."
-Cesar

Chavez, United Farm Workers leader' 9'

Since 1995, legislators with close ties to agricultural employers have
repeatedly introduced bills creating a new agricultural guest worker pro-

181. Id.
182. Id.

183. 20 C.F.R. § 655.101(c) (2002).
184. Id.
185. Danger, supra note 16, at 428-29.

186. Id. at 429.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

191. CoCKCRoF,

supra note 28, at 175.
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gram or attempting to substantially revise the current H-2 programs., 92
In 2000, negotiations developed among the National Council of Agricultural Employers (NCAE), the United Farm Workers (UFW), and members of Congress, to develop a compromise that would protect both
employer and employee.1 93 However,
its passage failed in the last mo94
ments of the 106th Congress.'
One year later in 2001, both the Republican and the Democratic parties introduced bills with guest worker provisions.1 9 5 The proposed Democratic bills afford more rights to the workers and have been advocated
by organizations such as the Farmworker Justice Fund, and the California
1 96
Rural Legal Assistance.

Additionally, the proposed legislation would end the exemption of H2A workers from coverage under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Protection Act (AWPA), which would be the biggest victory for the guest
worker.' 97 Under the bills, the H-2A workers would finally be protected
under a federal act concerning their pay, working conditions, and workrelated conditions, and most importantly, the AWPA would give H-2A
1 98
workers a private right of action in United States district courts.
Contrarily, bills introduced by Republicans Senator Larry Craig and
Representative Chris Cannon emphasize provisions that protect the
United States employer rather than the worker.' 99 The Republican bills
focus on an effort to transform the agricultural labor force into a market
of guest workers. 20 0 Sen. Craig's bill would lower wages at H2-A employ-

192. See Goldstein, supra note 24. Congress has been wary to adopt the proposals in
fear that they would transform the agricultural labor market into a compilation of vulnerable guest workers and undocumented participants, rather than a market of legal immigrants and citizens. In addition, the bills previously proposed were viewed with suspicion
particularly as they might eliminate or substantially weaken the laws, which protect the
wages and working conditions at employers that hire guest workers. Id.
193. See Mary Lee Hall, Defending the Rights of H-2A Farmworkers,27 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 521, 535 (2002).
194. See id. (noting that the deal was killed by Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, who was
ardently opposed to any farm worker-earned legalization program).
195. See Letter from Bruce Goldstein, Director of Farm Worker Justice Fund, to the
107th Congress (July 2, 1999) (on file with the California Rural Legal Assistance), available
at http://www. fwjustice.org/summary-s1313.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
196. See id.
197. See S. 1313, 107th Cong. (2001). The counterpart bill has been proposed by Representative Howard Berman. H.R. 2736, 107th Cong. (2001).
198. 29 U.S.C. § 1854 (a) (2000).
199. See S. 1161, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2457, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Letter
from Bruce Goldstein, Director of Farm Worker Justice Fund to the 107th Congress, supra
note 195.
200. See S. 1161; H.R. 2457. See also Letter from Bruce Goldstein, Director of Farm
Worker Justice Fund to the 107th Congress, supra note 195.
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ers, and substantially weaken or remove labor protections. 20 1 Rep. Cannon's bill would eliminate the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR),
which is intended to stifle an employer's ability to depress the wage
rate.2 °2 The bill also has various loophole provisions that would 20enable
3
many employers to escape paying the new lower minimum wage.
After evaluating the four bills members of Congress have introduced it
is clear that revisions made by the Democratic Party will be the most fair
and just legislation.
VII.

PROPOSAL:
REVISED

A

COMBINATION OF A BLANKET AMNESTY AND A

H-2

PROGRAM AS OUTLINED IN SENATOR

KENNEDY'S AND REPRESENTATIVE BERMAN'S
BILLS WILL BE JUST AND COMPENSATING
TO THE MIGRANT WORKER

In 1986, during the debates and discussions of the amnesty provisions

of IRCA, the Congress recognized that the United States had a large undocumented alien population living and working within its borders.20 4
But because of their undocumented status the foreign workers were not
afforded just and fair rights.20 5 The foreign workers, "...live[d]
in fear,
afraid to seek help when their rights were violated, when they [were] victimized by criminals, employers or landlords or when they [became]
20 6
ill."
Congress urged that ignoring the situation would be detrimental to the
United States and the aliens themselves. 20 7 They felt that alternatives to
solving the problem, such as intensifying interior enforcement or attempting a mass deportation of the illegal immigrants would be "costly, ineffective, and inconsistent with our immigrant heritage."20 8
The Committee therefore enacted an amnesty provision of IRCA,
which gave permanent residency status to illegal aliens that met certain

201. See S. 1161; H.R. 2457. See also Letter from Bruce Goldstein, Director of Farm
worker Justice Fund to the 107th Congress, supra note 195.
202. See S. 1161; H.R. 2457. See also Letter from Bruce Goldstein, Director of Farm
worker Justice Fund to the 107th Congress, supra note 195.
203. See S. 1161; H.R. 2457. See also Letter from Bruce Goldstein, Director of Farm
worker Justice Fund to the 107th Congress, supra note 195.
204. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5653.

205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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criteria. 209 The provisions granted legalization status to aliens who had
been unlawfully present in the United States since January 1982.2 10
The 1986 amnesty program for farm workers resulted in the compensation of a sizable workforce and eliminated the threat of deportation.2 1'
"The drafters of IRCA were concerned with the workers historical vulnerability to exploitation and deprivation of legal rights, thus this transi2 12
tion to legal status was an attempt to remedy these hardships.,
The amnesty provision recognized that it was the past failures of enforcing immigration laws that allowed illegal immigrants to settle in the
United States.2 13 The amnesty program also sought to enable the INS to
target its enforcement efforts on the new inflow of illegal aliens.2 14
During its implementation, many unions became involved in assisting
amnesty-eligible workers with their legalization applications.2 15 Several
individual labor unions, in areas such as Los Angeles and Houston, set up
education and training sessions for members.2 1 6 The union also helped
find legal assistance for members who needed assistance. 1 7
A similar program would currently be beneficial to the United States
government and to current undocumented immigrants who contribute to
the workforce. Opponents suggest that the United States has relied haphazardly on amnesty rather than directed labor immigration policies.2 18
However, because the influx of immigrants is again at an all time high,
and the current labor policies have become ineffective, a combination of
amnesty and a revised legislation, such as the one proposed by Senator
Kennedy and Representative Berman would best compensate
immigrants.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The truest act of courage
The strongest act of manliness
Is to sacrifice ourselves
209. See William M. Ross, The Road to H-2A and Beyond: An Analysis of Migrant
Worker Legislation in Agribusiness, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 267, 275 (2000).
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5653.
214. Id.
215. See Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 955, 1039 (1988).
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See ARTHUR B. MURPHY ET AL., LATINO WORKERS IN THE CONTEMPORARY
SOUTH

31 (1999).
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In a totally nonviolent struggle
For justice
To be man is to suffer
For others.
God help us be men.
-Cesar

Chavez, March 1968219

Temporary agricultural workers are often placed at the mercy of their
22°
employers, including abusive situations from which escape is difficult.
Unfortunately, many farm workers ultimately enter the employment rela22 1
tionship in a condition of dependency on their employers.
Guest worker programs, by their very nature, have subjected foreign
agricultural workers and their domestic counterparts to poor wages and
working conditions.2 22 Unfortunately, the H-2A program is responsible
for the inequities which lead employers to prefer immigrant agricultural
workers.2 23

A revised guest worker program as introduced by Sen. Kennedy and
Rep. Berman accompanied by an amnesty provision will justly compensate those foreign workers who continue to add to the United States
economy. The current guest worker program does not fulfill the goal of
bringing in needed workers without adding to the population.2 2 4 Instead
it creates unfair wages for hardworking contributing laborers, while subjecting them to discrimination by their employers.2 2 5 The guest workers
are isolated from others in secluded societies and are cruelly stigmatized.22 6 They are denied several of the basic rights other employees are
afforded in the United States. 227 They cannot compete economically for
the best available jobs, and they are stifled from asking for better
wages.22 8 The guest worker in essence becomes an indentured servant.2 29

219. TAYLOR, supra note 31, at i.
220. See U.S. v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 563-64 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting a case in which a

camp laborer operator was convicted for creating a working condition which paralleled
slavery).

221. Michael H. LeRoy & Wallace Hendricks, Should "AgriculturalLaborers" Continue to be Excluded from the National Labor Relations Act?, 48 EMORY L.J. 489, 503
(1999).
222. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 24.

223. See Baker, supra note 162, at 678-79.
224. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 24.

225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
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The United States government has refused to fully acknowledge the
significance of the immigrant laborers to the domestic economy. 230 The
immigrant laborers do the unpleasant but necessary jobs that most
United States workers shun.2 11 They build United States buildings, bus
United States tables, mind United States children, and wash dirty United
States dishes and clothes.232 Without the immigrant laborers, a significant number of these jobs would go unfilled.2 33 The human beings who
contribute to this country should be given respect and dignity as employees of the United States. Therefore, a revision of the current guest
worker programs, which affords generous rights to temporary laborers
and an amnesty provision given to those workers who are currently working in the United States will be the most effective and just long-term solution to the illegal immigration controversy.

229. See Pia Orrenius, Guest Worker Plan a Middle Course, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 25, 2001, availableat http://www.senate.gov/-gramm/pross/guestworkerdmn2.html (on
file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
230. Warming to the Idea: Guest Worker Program, AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMEN,
Jan. 28, 2001, available at http://www.senate.gov/-gramm/press/guestworkerads.html (on
file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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